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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee

)
)
)
)
)

vs.
RONALD SCOTT LEAHY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
Case No. 920382-CA

)

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Honorable Sheila
K. McCleve, Third Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County,
Utah, Salt Lake Department, against Appellant Leahy for the
principal sum of $7. That judgment was the result of a trial de
novo following an appeal by defendant/appellant from a Judgment
against him in the Small Claims Department of the Third Circuit
Court.
Appellant has claimed jurisdiction of this Court under Rules
3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the Utah Constitution.

Appellee challenges the

jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 2, and
Article VIII, Section 5, Constitution of Utah, and Sections 78-22(2),(3), 78-2a-3(2), 78-4-7.5 and 78-6-10(2) Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the Utah Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to hear

appellant Leahy's appeal in this instance?

2.

Does Section 78-6-10(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953 violate

any constitutional right of Appellant?
3.

Are Sections 12.56.530 and 12.56.560, Salt Lake City

Code/ valid and constitutional enactments of a municipal entity
within the State of Utah?
4.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the

sufficiency of evidence for the Judgment below, and, if so, was
sufficient evidence presented at the trial de novo in the Circuit
Court to sustain the $7 judgment?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/
STATUTES/ ORDINANCES/ RULES AND REGULATIONS

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Amendment XIV,

Section

I:

Section 1.

[Citizenship — Due process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United Statesf
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION

Article

Ir Section 7:

Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

2

Article

I, Section 11:

Sec. 11.

[Courts open — Redress of injuries.]

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.

Article

VIII, Section 2:

Sec. 2.

[Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring
law unconstitutional — Justice unable to
participate.]

The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall
consist of at least five justices. . . . The court
shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this
constitution or the Constitution of the United States,
except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices
of the Supreme Court. . . .

Article

VIII, Section 5:

Sec. 5

[Jurisdiction of district court and other
courts — Right of appeal.]

The district court shall have original jurisdiction in
all matters except as limited by this constitution or
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs.
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided
by statute. Except for matters filed originally with
the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED
Section

78-2-2(2),

Section 78-2-2.

(3)(j)i
Supreme Court jurisdiction
3

(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its
jurisdiction,
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
* **

(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any
court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d):

Section 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) Th€» Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
* **

(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a
circuit court;
Section 78-4-7.5:

Section 78-4-7.5. Trials de novo.
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear
trials de novo of the judgments of the justices' courts
and trials de novo of the small claims department of
the circuit court.
Section 78-6-1(1) (a)

78-6-1.

f

(7):

Creation — Jurisdiction — Biannual review - Counsel not necessary — Deferring multiple
claims of one plaintiff — Supreme Court to
govern procedures.

(1) The circuit court shall and, if certified by the
Judicial Council, the justice court may create a
department known as the -Small Claims Department- which
has jurisdiction in cases:

4

(a) for the recovery of money where the
amount claimed does not exceed $2,000
including attorney fees but exclusive of
court costs and interest and where the
defendant resides or the action of
indebtedness was incurred within the
jurisdiction of the court in which the action
is to be maintained; . . .
* * *

(7) Small claims shall be managed in accordance with
specified rules of procedure and evidence promulgated
by the Supreme Court.
Section

78-6-10

(1),

(2),

Section 78-6-10

(3)

(prior to 1988 amendment):

Conclusiveness of judgment —
Jurisdiction for appeals.

(1) The judgment of the small claims department of the
justices' and circuit court is conclusive upon the
plaintiff unless a counterclaim has been interposed.
(2) If the matter is heard in the small claims
department of the circuit court, the defendant may
appeal the judgment of the circuit court to the Court
of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal within five
days of the entry of the judgment against him.
(3) If the matter is heard in the small claims
department of the justices' court, the defendant may
obtain a trial de novo in the circuit court by filing
in the circuit court of the county a petition for trial
de novo within five days of the entry of the judgment
against him.
Section 78-6-10(1) t (2)
Section 78-6-10.
(1) Either party
claims department
the circuit court
appeal within ten
judgment.

(following 1988 amendment):
Appeals — Who may take and
jurisdiction.
may appeal the judgment of the small
of the circuit or justices' court to
of the county by filing a notice of
days of the notice of entry of the

(2) The appeal to the circuit couort is a trial de novo
and shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of
5

the small claims department, except a record of the
trial shall be maintained. The trial de novo may not
be heard by a small claims court judge pro tempore
appointed under Section 78-6-1,5. The decision of the
trial do novo may not be appealed unless the court
holds a state statute or local ordinance
unconstitutional.
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule

3(a):
Rule 3,

Appeal as of right: how taken.

(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An
appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, or
circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments,
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice
of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the
time allowed by Rule 4. . . .
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule

26(13)(a)i
Rule 26. Appeals.
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from
a judgment rendered in the justice court under this
rule, except:
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the
circuit court. The decision of the circuit
court is final, except when the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance
is raised in the justice court;
SALT LAKE CITY CODE

Section

12.56.150

12.56.150

B, C:
Parking meters —

Installation.

B. No person shall park any vehicle in any parking
meter space, except as otherwise permitted by this

6

chapter, without immediately depositing in the parking
meter contiguous to the space such lawful coin or coins
of the United States as are required for such meter and
designated by directions on the meter, and when
required by the direction on the meter, setting in
operation the timing mechanism thereof in accordance
with said directions, unless the parking meter
indicates at the time such vehicle is parked that an
unexpired portion remains of the period for which a
coin or coins has been previously deposited.
C. No person, except as otherwise provided by this
chapter, shall permit any vehicle parked by such person
to remain parked in any parking meter space during any
time when the parking meter contiguous to such space
indicates that no portion remains of the period for
which the last previous coin or coins has been
deposited, or beyond the time limited for parking as
designated on the meter.
Section

12.56.530:

12.56.530

Parking violation —

Owner's responsibility.

Whenever any vehicle shall have been parked in
violation of any of the provisions of any ordinance
prohibiting or restricting parking, the person in whose
name such vehicle is registered shall be prima facie
responsible for such violation and subject to the
penalty therefor.
Section

12.56.560:

12.56.560 Unauthorized use of streets —
liability of owner.

Strict

Whenever any vehicle shall have been employed in the
unauthorized use of streets, the person in whose name
such vehicle is registered shall be strictly liable for
such unauthorized use and the penalty therefor.

RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On or about October 27, 1990 an automobile registered to

Appellant Leahy was parked on the streets of Salt Lake City at a
location where there was a parking meter.
7

Due to expiration of

the time on the meter, a Salt Lake City official placed a civil
parking notice on the vehicle.

(Trial transcript ["Tr"], pages

4 and 6)
2.

As a result of Appellant Leahy's failure to respond to

said parking notice and to several additional notices mailed to
the address indicated on his motor vehicle registration, (the
same address as shown on Appellant's Notice of Appeal), Appellee
Salt Lake City filed a Small Claims Affidavit in the Third
Circuit Court of Utah, Salt Lake Department on March 10, 19 91 for
a civil penalty of $47. The Small Claims Affidavit and Order
were served upon Appellant Leahy on January 11, 1992.

(Tr, p. 7;

Record ["R"], documents 3 and 4)
3.

The said Affidavit stated that the subject vehicle had

been parked in violation of Section 12.56.150, Salt Lake City
Code, that at the time of said violation the vehicle was
registered to Appellant Leahy, and that Leahy was liable to the
City for being the owner of said vehicle in violation, as
provided by Section 12.56.530 of the City's ordinances. (R, doc.
3)
4.

A trial was held in the Small Claims Court on February

26, 1992, at which Appellant Leahy was present.

Plaintiff Salt

Lake City presented evidence that the subject vehicle had been
parked in violation of the City's parking ordinances and that the
registered owner of the vehicle was Defendant Leahy as of the
date of the violation.
5.

(Brief of Appellant, p. 6)

Defendant Leahy challenged the constitutionality of Salt

8

Lake City ordinances 12.56.150 and 12.56.530. The Small Claims
Court upheld the constitutionality of the said ordinances and
rendered judgment against Defendant Leahy for the principal sum
of $47 plus $26 court costs and $45 attorney's fees, for a total
judgment of $118.
6.

(Brief of Appellant, pp. 6, 9)

Defendant Leahy appealed the Small Claims Court judgment

to the Third Circuit Court, and a trial de novo was held on April
22, 1992 before the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve.

Plaintiff Salt

Lake City again presented evidence of the violation of the
subject vehicle and of Defendant Leahy's being the registered
owner of said vehicle at the time of violation.
7.

(Tr, pp. 5, 6)

Defendant Leahy chose not to present any evidence

whatsoever, including any evidence that the subject vehicle had
not been over-parked or that he was not the registered owner of
that vehicle at the time of violation.
8.

(Tr, at pp. 20, 21)

Once again Defendant Leahy challenged the

constitutionality of the aforementioned ordinances and the
sufficiency of the evidence against him.

He did not challenge

Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 before the Circuit
Court. (Tr, pp. 22-24)
9.

Salt Lake City argued that Section 12.56.560, Salt Lake

City Code, imposed strict liability upon Defendant Leahy and that
a prima facie case had been made against him under Section
12.56.530, Salt Lake City Cede.
10.

(Tr, pp. 21-23)

The Circuit Court found Salt Lake City Ordinances

12.56.130 and 12.56.530 to be constitutional and entered judgment
9

against Defendant Leahy for the principal sum of $7 plus costs.
(Tr, pp. 25-27)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The Utah Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear

Appellant Leahy's appeal. Utah Code Annotated Section 7 8-6-10
provides that the decision of the Circuit Court in a trial de
novo following an appeal from the Small Claims Court may not be
appealed unless the Circuit Court holds a State statute or local
ordinance unconstitutional.

In this instance the lower court

found no State statute or local ordinance unconstitutional.
2.

The state statute and municipal ordinances challenged by

Appellant are entitled under the law to a presumption of validity
and constitutionality.

The burden of proof is on Appellant to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt their invalidity.
3.

Appellant did not challenge Section 78-6-10 in either of

the courts bellow and is precluded from raising said challenge for
the first time on appeal to this Court.

Utah Code Annotated

Section 78-6-10 does not deprive Appellant of his due process
rights nor his right to seek redress through the Court under the
Utah Constitution.

Just as not all matters are appealable to the

Supreme Court, not all matters are appealable to the Court of
Appeals.

The purposes of the abbreviated procedures with respect

to the Small Claims Court is to relieve the workload upon the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and to allow those
X0

appellate courts to concentrate on areas of complexity.
4.

Salt Lake City ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 were

adopted pursuant to power granted by the Utah Legislature.

The

trial court's judgment against Appellant is presumed correct and
Appellant carries the burden of overcoming this presumption.
5.

Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.530 is a legislative

recognition of a common-law inference drawn from proven facts.
It is a civil parking ordinance, identical to the Chicago,
Illinois ordinance which was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court
and approved by several other states.

It does not violate

Appellant's due process rights, but simply shifts the burden to
the Defendant to go forward with proof.

Under the rationcile of

the Illinois court it imposes strict and vicarious liability on
the owner of an illegally parked vehicle.
6.

Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.560 expressly imposes

strict liability upon the registered owner of an automobile which
is parked in violation of the City's ordinances.

Strict

liability ordinances have long been recognized in the law,
particularly in regulatory measures where the mala

prohibitum

emphasis of the ordinance is upon the achievement of some social
betterment rather than the punishment of crimes, as in cases of
offenses mala In se.

Such strict liability is recognized under

Utah statutory law (Section 76-2-102 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
amended) and Utah decisional law.
7.

This Court has no jurisdiction to review the sufficiency

of evidence of the Circuit Court's judgment, which acted as an
11

appellate court from the Small Claims Court.

However, the trial

transcript establishes that there was sufficient evidence
presented at the trial de novo to sustain the judgment of the
Circuit Court.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS LACKS JURISDICTION IN
THIS MATTER.
A.

APPELLANT FAILED TO GIVE NOTICE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL.

Appellant has challenged the validity of a State statute
herein: Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
However, Appellant has failed to serve a copy of this proceeding
upon the Utah Attorney General.

Section 7 8-33-1, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, requires that
. . . if a statute or state franchise or permit is
alleged to be invalid the Attorney General shall be
served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to
be heard.
See Hemenway & Moser v. Funk, 106 P.2d 779 (Utah 1940).

This

required notice is a condition precedent to Appellant going
forward in the instant appeal, and this Court lacks jurisdiction
to consider this matter in the absence of proof of such
notification having been given.
B. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER APPELLANT'S CHALLENGE TO
STATE STATUTE SECTION 78-6-10 SINCE THIS CHALLENGE IS RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL HERE.
Defendant/Appellant Leahy does not allege, and there is no
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record or transcript to show, that he challenged the validity or
constitutionality of Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, before the Small Claims Court.
p. 6.)

(Brief of Appellant,

Neither does Leahy allege, nor does the transcript of the

de novo trial show, any challenge to the said State statute
before the Circuit Court of appeal from the Small Claims Court.
(Tr., pp. 22-24.)

Defendant/Appellant is precluded from raising

a challenge to a statute which is raised for the first time
before this Court of Appeals. City of Monticello v. Christensen,
788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990); State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah App.
1990).
C. UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ONLY
THAT APPELLATE AUTHORITY GRANTED IT BY STATE STATUTE. THERE IS
NO STATUTE WHICH GRANTS THIS COURT JURISDICTION TO HEAR
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S APPEAL HEREIN.
It is Appellee Salt Lake City's contention that the Utah
Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this
instance.

This Court was created by State statute and has only

such jurisdiction as is granted by statute. Article VIII of the
Utah Constitution provides for a Supreme Court (Article VIII
Section 3), a District Court (Article VIII Section 5), and states
that:
The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and
appellate, shall be provided by statute except for
matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there
shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court
or original jurisdiction to a court with appellate
jurisdiction over the cause. Article VIII Section 5.
(Empha sis added.)
In a matter filed in the Small Claims Court, that Court is
13

the Court of original jurisdiction, and the initial trial is
conducted before that Court:
78-6-1.

Creation — Jurisdiction — Biannual review - Counsel not necessary — Deferring multiple
claims of one plaintiff — Supreme Court to
govern procedures.

(1) The circuit court shall and, if certified by the
Judicial Council, the justice court may create a
department known as the "Small Claims Department" which
has jurisdiction in cases:
(a) for the recovery of money where the
amount claimed does not exceed $2,000
including attorney fees but exclusive of
court costs and interest and where the
defendant resides or the action of
indebtedness was incurred within the
jurisdiction of the court in which the action
is to be maintained; . . .
•

*

*

(7) Small claims shall be managed in accordance with
simplified rules of procedure and evidence promulgated
by the Supreme Court.
Section 76-6-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended.
An appeal from the judgment of the Small Claims Court is to
the Circuit Court of the County in which the Small Claims
Department is located.

Rather than simply being an appeal on

matters of law and sufficiency of evidence for the judgment
below, the appellant from the Small Claims Court is entitled to a
trial de novo to present the same, or additional facts, as those
presented below, and to present the same or additional legal
arguments and to challenge the constitutionality of ordinances
and statutes.

Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides

that:
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(1) Either party
claims department
the circuit court
appeal within ten
judgment.

may appeal the judgment of the small
of the circuit or justices' court to
of the county by filing a notice of
days of the notice of entry of the

(2) The appeal to the circuit court is a trial de novo
and shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of
the small claims department, except a record of the
trial shall be maintained. The trial de novo may not
be heard by a small claims court judge pro tempore
appointed under Section 78-6-1.5. The decision of the
trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court
holds a state statute or local ordinance
unconstitutional.
As is provided in the aforementioned Section 78-6-10, the
decision of the trial de novo may not be appealed unless the
Court holds a State statute or local ordinance unconstitutional.
By statute, the Circuit Court acts as an appellate court for all
appeals from the Small Claims Department and is the court of last
resort provided by statute unless an ordinance or statute is
found unconstitutional.
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear
trials de novo of the judgments of the justices' courts
and trials de novo of the small claims department of
the circuit court.
Section 78-4-7.5.

See City of Monticello v. Christensenf 788

P.2d 513 (Utah 1990) and State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah App.
1990).
Appeals from final civil judgments of the Circuit Courts are
to the Court of Appeals (Section 78-4-11).

The jurisdiction of

the Court of Appeals is set forth at Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended, which provides, inter

alia:

(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
15

*

"k ie

(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a
circuit court:
(Empha sis added.)
There is no provision in the State statutes for the Court of
Appeals to hear a challenge to the constitutionality of a State
statute or a municipal ordinance where the challenge was raised,
or could have been raised, in the Small Claims Court, and again
in the Circuit Court acting as an appellate court, where no
statute or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional.

For

these reasons, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear
this case, and the appeal should be dismissed.

POINT II
STATE STATUTES AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ARE
ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY. EVERY REASONABLE
CONSTRUCTION WILL BE UTILIZED TO RENDER A
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT AND ITS CLASSIFICATIONS
VALID. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE
CHALLENGER TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
THE INVALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE OR STATUTE.
Appellant Leahy has challenged the constitutionality of a
State statute, Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, for the
first time on this appeal. He also challenged two Salt Lake City
Ordinances, Sections 12.56.530 and 12.56.560, Salt Lake City
Code.
State statutes, as well as municipal ordinances, are
presumptively valid.

Courts will indulge in every reasonable

construction to render the legislative act valid and
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constitutional.

Professor McQuillin, in his respected treatise

on municipal corporation, has stated:
No ordinance or law will be declared unconstitutional
unless clearly so, and every reasonable [effort] will
be made to sustain it. Not only must
unconstitutionality appear clear, but, it has been
asserted, it must appear and be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . If the constitutional questions
raised are fairly debateable, the court must declare
the ordinance constitutional, as the court cannot and
must not substitute its judgment for that of the local
legislative body.
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §19.06 at pp. 377-78 (3rd
Ed.Rev.); see also, JEcl. §19.14.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue as follows:
It is well settled in this state, as elsewhere, that
the courts will not declare a statute unconstitutional
unless it clearly and manifestly violates some
provision of the constitution of the United States.
Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of an act, and every reasonable doubt
resolved in favor of its validity. (Citations omitted)
The whole burden lies on him who denies the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment.
State v. Packer, 297 P. 1013, 1016 (Utah, 1931).
v. Packard, 250 P. 2d 561 (Utah, 1952).

See also, State

(Emphasis added.)

This rule of construction has been emphasized more recently
by the Court, which held:
It [a city ordinance] should not be held to be invalid
unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be
incompatible with some particular constitutional
provision.
Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037 (Utah, 1975), cert.
den. 425 U.S. 915, 47 L.Ed.2d 766 (authorities omitted, emphasis
added).

See also, City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d

513 (Utah 1990) .
17

POINT III.
SECTION 78-6-10, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
VIOLATES NO LEGALLY PROTECTED RIGHT OF
APPELLANT UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

A.

THE STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.

Appellant claims that since the plaintiff may choose the
Small Claims Court as the forum in which to commence legal action
(where the amount in controversy is within the Small Claims
Court's jurisdiction), and that since the only appeal from a
decision of a trial de novo in the Circuit Court is where the
Court holds a State statute or local ordinance unconstitutional,
Section 78-6-10 Utah Code Annotated 1953 unconstitutionally
deprives defendants in small claims actions of seeking redress
protected under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, and
deprives defendants of due process of law under Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 7.
Appellant, despite his burden of proving the statute
unconstitutional in the face of a presumption of validity, cites
only one case in support of his proposition:

Liedtke v.

Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982).

However, that case is

inapposite for a number of reasons.

First, it did not address

either the issue of open access to the courts under Article I,
Section 11 or due process of law under Article I, Section 7.
Rather it addressed the issue of whether former Section 78-6-10
Utah Code Annotated 1953 was in violation of Article I, Section
24, Utah Constitution that all laws of a general nature shall
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have uniform operation.
At the time of the Liedtke decision, (prior to the 1988
amendment), Section 78-6-10 provided that plaintiffs may appeal
to the District Court only from Small Claims Court judgments
granted on a counterclaim, if such was asserted by defendants.
The judgment on plaintiffs' own Complaints were conclusive upon
them.

Defendants were afforded an appeal from any judgment.

The

Court held that that statute did not violate the constitutional
requirement that all laws of a general nature have uniform
operation.
Although Appellant Leahy has not challenged the current
Section 78-6-10 (as amended in 1988) under Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 24, generally considered the equivalent of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, it would certainly withstand such a challenge. As
stated in the Liedtke case,
The small claims courts were established as separate
departments of justice of the peace courts and circuit
courts in this state for the purpose of providing
speedy adjudication of money claims not exceeding $400
[since increased to $2,000]• Sections 78-6-1, et seq.,
provide expedited procedure, reduced filing fees, and
informal presentation of evidence and witnesses in
small claims courts, so that the fees for an attorney
may be avoided.
Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80, 81 (Utah 1982).
The Court then went on to state that:
Statutes which treat classes of citizens differently do
not offend equal protection guarantees unless the
classification and different treatment bear no rational
relationship to the objective of the legislation.
The Court found that the differing rights of appeal between
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plaintiffs and defendants, established by the statute, bore a
rational relationship to the objective of the legislation - the
speedy adjudication of small claims:
Under §78-6-11, an appeal by plaintiff from an adverse
judgment on his own complaint would afford plaintiff a
trial de novo — thus two choices of forum — and would
entirely defeat the objective of speedy adjudication of
small claims. We do not find it to be unreasonable,
nor a denial of equal protection, for the legislature
to deny plaintiff two such bites of the apple.
Liedtke, supra at 82.
The limitation complained of by the plaintiff in the Liedtke
case has been eliminated by current statutes which allow an
appeal by either the plaintiff or defendant from any Small Claims
Court judgment for a trial de novo in the Circuit Court.
Appellant Leahy, however, contends that the present statute which
limits appeals from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals to
appeals from judgments finding a statute or ordinance
unconstitutional benefits the plaintiff to the detriment of the
defendant since
[i]t is difficult to imagine a case in which a
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance would be asserted, in a small claims matter,
except as a defense to a claim.
Brief of Appellant p. 8.
In fact, a plaintiff in a small claims action has as much
right as a defendant to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance in attempting to obtain redress in matters
within the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court. Whichever
litigant challenges the constitutionality of the statute or
ordinance has its first bite at the apple in the small claims
20

proceeding.

If the statute or ordinance is upheld by the Small

Claims Court, that same litigant has a second bite at the apple
before the Circuit Court.

Neither the plaintiff nor the

defendant is treated differently, so there is not even an issue
of equal protection of the laws.
However, even if it is the case that the defendant is more
likely to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance than a plaintiff, the defendant still has two bites at
the apple, either (1) in the Small Claims Court and in the
Circuit Court if the matter is initially filed in the Small
Claims Court, or (2) in the Circuit Court and the Court of
Appeals if the matter is originally filed in the Circuit Court.1
The plaintiff's two bites at the apple come in his appeal to the
Circuit Court and his appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Applying the rationale of the Liedtke case, this statute's
treatment of classes of citizens differently does not offend
equal protection guarantees since the classification and
different treatment bear a rational relationship to the objective
of the legislation, which is speedy adjudication of relatively
minor monetary claims, providing expedited procedure, reducing
filing fees, and allowing for informal presentation of evidence
and witnesses, so that fees for an attorney may be avoided.
There are numerous examples under Utah law of different

l

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction from all
appeals from the Circuit Courts, except those from the Small
Claims Department of the Circuit Court. Section 78-2a-3(2)(d),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
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treatment of classes of citizens in the Courts.

These include

limitations on appeals to the Supreme Court where appeals are
provided by statute to other appellate courts.

The purposes of

these limitations include relieving the Supreme Court of an
excessive workload and allowing it to concentrate on particular
areas of complexity and greater moment.

This different treatment

of classes of citizens likewise does not offend equal protection
guarantees since the classification and different treatment bear
a rational relationship to the objective of the legislation.
In addition, a defendant objecting to a finding of
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance by a trial de novo in
the Circuit Court may petition the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.

Further, if this Court of Appeals has authority,

which Appellee denies, to hear the instant matter, this present
appeal is an example of a right of appeal which Defendant Leahy
has, despite the supposed limitations imposed by Section 78-610.2

2

In an earlier case, the Utah Supreme Court held Section 786-10 U.C.A. 1953, in its earlier form, to be constitutional
against an equal protection challenge, saying:
The Small Claims Court is totally a creature of
statute. Given its nature and purpose it is not
unreasonable for the legislature to provide a different
time for taking an appeal from the Small Claims Court,
from that provided for appeals from other courts.
Defendant as an appellant from a Small Claims Court has
been given a reasonable time within which to take an
appeal. He finds himself within a reasonable
classification.
Larson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 P.2d 233 (Utah 1976).
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B. THE STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO OPEN ACCESS TO THE COURTS.
Appellant Leahy has utterly failed to meet his burden of
showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Section 78-6-10 is
violative of the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 11, since he has cited no cases or other
authority for his position.
An extensive discussion by the Utah Supreme Court of the
meaning, history, and applicability of Utah Constitution Article
I, Section 11, and its relationship to other constitutional
sections, was set forth in the case of Berry v. Beech, 111 P. 2d
670 (Utah 1985) • The Court stated that a plain reading of
Section 11 establishes that the framers of the Constitution
intended that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights.
Berry, supra at 675.

In analyzing the relationship between

Section 11 and other constitutional provisions the Court stated:
The meaning of Section 11 must be taken not only from
its history and plain language, but also from its
functional relationship to other constitutional
provisions. Section 11 and the Due Process Clause of
Article I, Section 7 are related both in their
historical origins and to some extent in their
constitutional functions, to a degree, the two
provisions are complementary and even overlap, but they
are not wholly duplicative.
Berry, supra at 675. The Court then went on to analyze the open
courts provision:
Specifically, neither the due process nor the open
courts provision constitutionalizes the common-law or
otherwise freezes the law governing private rights and
remedies as of the time of statehood. . . . Once a
cause of action under a particular rule of law accrues
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to a person by virtue of an injury to his rights, that
person's interest in the cause of action and the law
which is the basis for a legal action becomes vested,
and a legislative repeal of the law cannot
constitutionally divest the injured person of the right
to litigate the cause of action to a judgment. . . .
On the other hand, Section 11 rights are not always
paramount, either. They do not sweep all other
constitutional rights and prerogatives before them.
They, too, like many constitutional rights, must be
weighed against and harmonized with other
constitutional provisions. The accommodation of
competing, and sometimes clashing, constitutional
rights and prerogatives is a task of the greatest
delicacy, although a common and necessary one in
constitutional adjudication. For example, the right to
protection of a person's reputation must be
accommodated to the right of others to speak freely.
Berry, supraf at pp. 676, 677.

(Footnotes deleted.)

The Berry Court announced a two part test in determining
whether Section 11 rights and the prerogative of the legislature
are properly accommodated:
First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy "by due course of law" for vindication of his
constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the
substitute must be substantially equal in value or
other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing
essentially comparable substantive protection to one's
person, property or reputation, although the form of
the substitute remedy may be different. . . .
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action
may be justified only if there is a clear social or
economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective.
Berry, supra, at p. 680.
Section 78-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, prior to its
1988 amendment, provided for an appeal mechanism whereby the
judgment of the Small Claims Department of the Circuit Court was
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conclusive upon the plaintiff unless a counterclaim had been
interposed.

A defendant could appeal the judgment of the Small

Claims Court to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal
within five days of the entry of judgment against him.

The 1988

amendments to Section 78-6-10 modified the rights of appeal to
the Circuit Court by providing for a trial de novo by either
party and extended the time for filing a notice of appeal to ten
days after the notice of entry of judgment. The provision for an
appeal from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals where a
State statute or local ordinance was found unconstitutional was a
new right added by the legislature which was not found in the
statute prior to the 1988 amendment.
Applying the analysis of the Berry Court, the Section 11
open courts provision was satisfied by the 1988 amendments
because the new law provided an injured person with an effective
and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law," for
vindication of his constitutional interests which was
"substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy
abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive
protection to one's person, property, or reputation, although the
form of the substitute remedy may be different."

Berry, supra,

at p. 680.

C.
RIGHTS.

THE STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS

Again, appellant's challenge of the subject statute on due
process grounds must fail since he has failed to meet his burden,
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beyond a reasonable doubt, of showing the unconstitutionality of
the statute under Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7.
With respect to that constitutional section, the Utah
Supreme Court has explained the due process guarantee as follows:
[N]eith€sr a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny
a person a constitutional right or deprive such person
of a vested interest in property without any
opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking
of property without due process of law.
Many attempts have been made to further define "due
process'" but they all resolve into the thought that a
party shall have his day in court — that is each party
shall have the right to a hearing before a competent
court, with the privilege of being heard and
introducing evidence to establish his cause or his
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record
thus made.
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (1945) cited in
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d
1293, 1296 (1982).
The due process rights provided to Appellant Leahy under
Section 78-6-10 include the right to a trial in the Small Claims
Court, with the privilege confronting and cross-examining
witnesses, being heard and introducing evidence to establish his
defense, together with all other privileges appertaining to that
proceeding.

He has the right to appeal that judgment to the

Circuit Court and to have a trial de novo, again with all the
privileges appertaining thereto, and he has the right to appeal
to the Court of Appeals from judgment finding a State statute or
local ordinance to be unconstitutional.

In a very real sense, it

may be said that he has had his "day in court" twice. The fact
that he may not further appeal if a State statute or local
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ordinance is not found unconstitutional in no way deprives him of
his day in court and in no way deprives him of his due process
rights under the Utah Constitution.

POINT IV.
THE SUBJECT MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES WERE VALIDLY
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO POWER GRANTED BY THE UTAH
LEGISLATURE.
In 19 52, the Utah Supreme Court held that the City of Ogden
did not have either the express or implied power to make the
registration of an illegally parked vehicle prima facie evidence
that the owner committed or authorized the violation.
Qgden v. Nasfell, 349 P. 2d 507 (Utah 1952).

City of

However, this

holding was based upon the Dillon Rule, that is, "any fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation (city)
and the power denied . . . "

249 P.2d at 508, citing 1 Dillon

Municipal Corp., 5th Ed., p. 448, §237.
The Utah Supreme court strongly repudiated the Dillon Rule
in State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (1980).

In Hutchinson, the

court upheld a county ordinance based on Section 17-5-77 U.C.A.
(1953), which granted counties the authority to enact all
necessary measures to promote the general health, safety, morals,
and welfare of their citizens. The Court found that the
Legislature had made a similar grant of power to the cities,
citing Section 10-8-84, U.C.A., (1953):
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for
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carrying into effect or discharging all powers and
duties confirmed by this chapter, such as are necessary
and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the
health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the
city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein . . .
(Emphasis added. )
Whether that authority extended to the enactment of a strict
liability ordinance was answered by Salt Lake City v. Ronnenburg,
674 P.2d 128 (Utah 1983), where an ordinance imposing strict
criminal liability upon a tavern owner for permitting an underage
person to come upon tavern premises was upheld.
In upholding the county ordinance based on the general
welfare provision, the court in Hutchinson utilized a parallel
analysis to City ordinances.

See, e.g., 624 P.2d at 1122,

wherein the Court noted that "charter cities have been endowed
with even more wide ranging powers. . • .," and the "grant of
general welfare power to counties is duplicated by a similar
grant to the cities, and this Court has on several occasions
squarely sustained City ordinances solely on the basis of the
general welfare clause."

Citations omitted.

Dillon Rule, the Court further explained that

In abrogating the
,T

[b]road

construction of the powers of counties and cities is consistent
with the current needs of local governments."

624 P.2d at 1126.

In addition to the general welfare grant, the state has also
made specific grants of power which "should generally be
construed with reasonable latitude in light of the broad language
of the general welfare clause which may supplement the power
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found in a specific delegation."

Hutchinson, supra, at 1126.

Section 41-6-17(a)(1) U.C.A. (1953) grants local authorities the
power to regulate or prohibit stopping, standing, or parking.
Section 10-8-11 allows cities to "regulate the use of streets,
alleys, avenues, sidewalks, crosswalks, parks, and public
grounds. . . ."
Further expanding the cities' power to enact ordinances is
Section 10-3-702, which provides:
[A municipality] may pass any ordinance to regulate,
require, prohibit, govern, control or supervise any
activity, business, conduct or condition authorized by
this act or any other provision of law. . . . [The
municipality] may prescribe a minimum penalty for the
violation of any municipal ordinance and may impose a
civil penalty for the unauthorized use of a municipal
property, including" but not limited to, the use of
parks, streets, and other public grounds or equipment.
Rules of civil procedure shall be substantially
followed.
The fact that Salt Lake City ordinances 5.56.530 and
5.56.560 are civil ordinance, imposing civil penalties, is a
further argument in the City's favor. Whereas the ordinance in
Nasfell was a criminal ordinance the standard of proof of which
was "beyond a reasonable doubt,M under Salt Lake City's parking
program the maximum penalty for over-parking is $47 (Trial
transcript, at page 8), and the standard of proof is a
"preponderance of evidence."

Nasfell is not controlling both

because it has been judicially repudiated and because it is
inapposite.
It is clear that pursuant to Hutchinson and state enabling
statutes, the City has the power to adopt the above ordinances.
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POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT
IS PRESUMED CORRECT AND APPELLANT CARRIES THE
BURDEN 'OF OVERCOMING THIS PRESUMPTION.
Two classes of presumptions apply in this action.
are legal presumptions.

The first

When a criminal defendant is given a

fair opportunity to present his case, all presumptions favor the
validity of the trial court judgment.

State v. Seymour, 417 P.2d

655 (Utah, 1966).
The trial court rendered a civil judgment against appellant.
That judgment is likewise presumed valid.

The effect of such

presumption is to place the burden of showing error or prejudice
on the appellant who seeks to upset the trial court judgment.
State v. Hamilton, 419 P.2d 770 (Utah, 1966).
Thus, on appeal, all legal presumptions support the trial
court judgment.

Appellee will demonstrate, further, that the

factual presumption which the trial court applied is in all
respects constitutionally supportive of the judgment against
appellant.
POINT VI.
A COMMON LAW PARKING PRESUMPTION EXISTS,
INDEPENDENT OF ENABLING STATUTES OR LOCAL
ORDINANCES. IT IS NOT A PRESUMPTION OF LAW,
BUT IS AN INFERENCE DRAWN FROM PROVEN FACTS.
AS SUCH, IT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COURTS
OF THIS COUNTRY FOR NEARLY HALF A CENTURY.
Section 12.56.530, Salt Lake City Code/ provides for prima
facie responsibility of a person in whose name a vehicle is
registered whenever such vehicle is parked in violation of the
provisions of any ordinance prohibiting or restricting parking.
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Unlike the presumptions of law applicable on appeal (discussed
under Point V ) , the factual presumption established by Section
12.56.530 and applied by the trial court is not a presumption in
a precise sense.

It is merely an inference drawn from facts

established by proof in the case:
Presumptions are generally grouped into two major
classes — presumptions of law and presumptions of
fact. These are sometimes referred to, respectively as
legal and natural presumptions. Presumptions of fact
are, in their nature, inferences.
29 Am.Jur.2d 160.
Factual presumptions are therefore merely inferences drawn
from proven facts. Their basis is experience and reason:
A presumption of fact — which is the same as, or akin
to, an inference — is a logical and reasonable
conclusion of the existence of a fact in a case, not
presented by direct evidence as to the existence of the
fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of
other facts from which, by the process of logic and
reason, based upon human experience, the existence of
the assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of the
fact. A presumption of fact, or inference, is nothing
more than a probable or natural explanation of facts,
is at best a mere argument, and does not estop a party
from proving his case by competent evidence. A
presumption of this kind arises from the commonly
accepted experiences of mankind and the inferences
which reasonable men would draw from experiences. In
those instances where one fact is proved or ascertained
and another fact is its uniform concomitant, such other
fact is presumed or inferred, without other proof,
because of the uniform experience concerning the
connection between the two facts. Evidence of the
inherent capacity and strong tendency of something to
cause an event is ordinarily evidence that the event
did so result therefrom.
29 Am.Jur.2d, 161.
Needless to say, it is the prerogative of the trier of
fact —

here the trial judge —

to determine whether to apply a
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presumption or inference of fact. On appeal, such inferences are
presumed to be reasonable and are construed in a light most
favorable to the State.

State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 751 (1977).

For nearly half a century, there has existed a widely
accepted judicial presumption to the effect that evidence of
ownership and illegal parking is sufficient to support an
inference that the owner parked the car.

This presumption has

repeatedly been held sufficient to sustain a conviction if the
inference is not explained or refuted by other evidence.3

3

The following reported cases evidence early acceptance of
this historic judicial presumption:
1934

New York

People v. Marchetti, 276 N.Y.S. 708

1938

Kentucky

Commonwealth v. Kroger, 122 S.W.2d 1006,
1009

1940

New York

People v. Rubin, 31 N.E.2d 501

1943

Illinois

City of Chicago v. Crane, 49 N.E.2d 802,
804 (quoted with approval from Kroger,
supra.)

1946

Rhode Island State v. Morgan, 48 A.2d 248, 249
(Affirming conviction by an evenly
divided court)

1947

Pennsylvania
Commonwealth v. Smith, 60 Pa. D&C 520
Pennsylv.

1949

Missouri

City of St. Louis v. Cook, 221 S.W.2d
468, 470 (Common law presumption
recognized but decided on other grounds)

1955

New York

People v. Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d 377,
49 A.L.R.2d 499

1960

New York

People v. Avis Rent-A-Car Div., Cent.
Taxicab Co., 206 N.Y.S.2d 400

1962

New York

People v. Johnson, 228 N.Y.S.2d 527
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This common law presumption has been developed through the
courts; accordingly, it exists independent of enabling statutes
or local ordinances.
With one erroneous exception/ no court under reported case
law has ever refused to recognize this common law presumption.
Occasionally courts question the power of local governments to
adopt the presumption by ordinance.

But because the presumption

exists by virtue of the common law, the existence or nonexistence of local ordinance has had no legal effect on
application of the presumption by the courts.
Thirty years ago the Utah Supreme Court denied Ogden City
authority to adopt an ordinance creating the prima facie parking
presumption.
(1952).

Nasfell v. Ogden, 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507

It relied upon the Dillon rule of strict statutory

construction to question Ogden's enabling authority.

The Court's

majority opinion did not address the existence of the
longstanding judicial presumption.

However, its existence* was

specifically noted in Justice Crockett's dissenting opinion.
For at least three decades since the Nasfell decision, Salt
Lake City Courts (and their successor Circuit Courts) have
continued to accept this common law rule of evidence and have
4

0nly one case has ever refused to recognize this
presumption. State v. Scogqin, 7 2 S.E.2d 54 (1952). The opinion
was written under the misimpression that courts had refused to
accept the presumption. The court's superficial research into
the case law recognizing the judicial presumption was criticized
in two strong dissents, citing the numerous cases overlooked in
the majority opinion. The Court later upheld the validity of a
legislative presumption to the same effect. State v. Rumfelt, 85
S.E.2d 398 (1955).
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utilized registered ownership as evidence to prima facie identify
drivers of illegally parked vehicles.
In the case here under appeal, the trial judge applied the
ownership inference consistent with all applicable case law as
well as with the City's ordinance which is a legislative
recognition of that common law inference.

The trial court is

entitled to take judicial notice of common-law presumptions as
well as codified presumptions (Rule 301, Utah Rules of Evidence).

POINT VII•
NEITHER THE COMMON LAW PARKING PRESUMPTION
NOR THE PRESUMPTION CODIFIED IN APPELLEE'S
PARKING ORDINANCE IS VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANT'S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
Rarely, if ever, has a presumption as to parking liability
similar to the one in question been ruled to violate
constitutional due process.5
5

The following jurisdictions have upheld such presumptions
(either judicial or legislatively enacted) when attacked on due
process grounds:
Illinois

Supreme Court

1978 Chicago v. Hertz Commercial
Leasing Corp., 375 N.E.2d
1285, cert, denied, 439 U.S.
929, 99 S.Ct. 315, 58 L.Ed.
322

Iowa

Supreme Court

1976 Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d
102

Texas

Court of Crim- 1975 Snell v. State, 518 S.W.2d 383
inal Appeals

Oregon

Court of
Appeals

1974 City of Portland v. Kirk, 518
P.2d 665
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The prevailing caselaw all upholds the constitutionality of
parking presumptions.

They are directly in point.

contradicted in reported case law.

They cire not

Such is undoubtedly the

reason Appellant cited no authorities whatsoever in his appeal
brief in this case.
The numerous cases upholding the constitutionality of the
parking presumption are thoroughly buttressed by the latest U.S.
Supreme Court decisions.

Through a recent series of cases, the

Supreme Court has defined the due process standard against which
Oklahoma

Court of Crim- 1969 Cantrell v. Oklahoma City, 454
inal Appeals
P.2d 676

Missouri

Court of
Appeals

Texas

Court of Crim- 1964 Stecher v. State, 383 S.W.2d
inal Appeals
594

Ohio

Supreme Court

1960 City of Columbus, Ohio v.
Webster, 164 N.E.2d 734

Arkansas

Supreme Court

1957 Red Top Driv-Ur-Self v. Potts,
300 S.W.2d 261.

New York

County Court

1951 People v. Lang, 106 N.Y.S.2d
829; see also People v. Rubin,
supra' People v. Hildebrandt,
supra; People v. Avis Rent-ACar Div., Cent. Taxicab Co.,
supra; People v. Johnson,
supra

Missouri

Supreme Court

1949 City of St. Louis v. Cook, 221
S.W.2d 468

California

Superior Court 1940 People v. Biqman, 100 P. 2d 370

Michigan

Supreme Court

Massachu- Supreme Court
setts

Kansas City v. Howe, 416
S.W.2d 683

1938 People v. Kavne, 282 N.W. 248
1934 Commonwealth v. Ober, 189 N.E.
601
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presumptions are to be tested in criminal cases.

Barnes v.

United States, 412 U.S. 837, 37 L.Ed.2d 380, 93 S.Ct. 2357,
(1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 24 L.Ed.2d 610, 90
S.Ct. 642 (1970); Learv v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 23 L.Ed.2d
57, 89 S.Ct. 1532 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136,
15 L.Ed.2d 210, 86 S.Ct. 279 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380
U.S. 63, 13 L.Ed.2d 658, 85 S.Ct. 754 (1965); Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463, 87 L.Ed. 1519, 635 S.Ct. 1241 (1943).
In Learv v. United States, supra, the Court summarized the
constitutionality test as follows:
The upshot of Tot, Gainey and Romano is, we think, that
a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as
"irrationalM or "arbitrary" and hence unconstitutional,
unless it can at least be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
depend.
Thus, the Leary Court concluded that an inference meets due
process standards if it can at least be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.

This more-

likely-than-not standard has been adhered to in the subsequent
cases of Turner and Barnes.
In the Turner case, supra, the Court upheld a conviction for
possession of illegally imported heroin.

The defendant in that

case was not shown to have had any knowledge whatsoever of the
drug being illegally imported.

The Court took notice of the fact

that heroin is generally imported illegally into this country and
upheld the inference that the defendant knew these drugs had been
3S

illegally imported.
In the more recent case of Barnes v. United States, supra,
the Court considered the constitutionality of instructing the
jury that it may infer from defendant's unexplained possession of
recently stolen mail, that he possessed the mail with knowledge
that it was stolen.

The Court held the inference also to be

valid.
Thus, in recent cases, due process requirements were met by
showing a "more-likely-than-not" connection between the proven
facts and the inferred fact. The Court did not fully define the
constitutional test for inferences in criminal cases. It
appears, however, to regard the "reasonable doubt" test as
substantially equivalent"to the due process standard.

The Court

in Barnes states:
To the extent that the "rational connection", "more
likely than not," and "reasonable doubt" standards bear
ambiguous relationships to one another, the ambiguity
is traceable in large part to variations in language
and focus rather than to differences of substance.
Id. p. 843.
In Barnes, two factors persuaded the Court that both the due
process and reasonable doubt standards had met:

first, that the

inference was rooted in the common-law; and second, the
probability of a relationship based upon "experience" and "common
sense".

Jld. at p. 845.

The factors which persuaded the U.S. Supreme Court in Barnes
are present in the instant case. The impressive historical
acceptance of the traditional common-law presumption here in
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question is detailed under Point III. The roots of that
inference are half-a-century deep.

In referencing the

significance of such common-law acceptance, Barnes Court stated:
This longstanding and consistent judicial approval of
the [jury] instruction, reflecting accumulated common
experience, provides strong indication that the
instruction comports with due process.
Id. at p. 844.
Recent court decisions invalidating irrebuttable
presumptions are not applicable here, since all presumptions
referred to herein are fully rebuttable.
Of course, the challenged parking inference is more than
rooted in our accumulated case law experience.
both experience and good sense.

It is based upon

In the present case, the

challenged presumption only permitted the inference of
responsibility from unexplained evidence of ownership and illegal
parking.

Defendant/Appellant Leahy failed to present any

evidence whatsoever in rebuttal. (Trial transcript, pages 20, 21)
On the basis of this evidence alone, common sense and experience
tell us of a high probability that respondent was the driver of
the vehicle.

In the absence of some contrary explanation, such

evidence was clearly sufficient to enable the trial court to find
by a preponderance of evidence that petitioner was the vehicle
driver.
There is, of course, evidence of the high correlation
between vehicle ownership and operation. The Supreme Court of
Michigan found by survey taken on random dates, that in 87.6% of
the cases where automobiles were parked in violation of the
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ordinance, the owner of such automobile had, himself, committed
the violation.

In 8% of the cases, such violation had been

committed by immediate members of the owner's family, and in 4.4%
of such cases, the violation was committed by some other person.
People v. Kavne, supra, at p. 249.
The closeness of this relationship between the registered
owner of an automobile and its operation is emphasized by the
Court in People v. Biqman, supra:
Relationship between the registered owner of an
automobile and its operation is natural; if he is not
the operator on any occasion that fact is directly
within his knowledge and in the ordinary course of
events can easily be proved with such certainty as
almost entirely to exclude the possibility of a false
conviction. The presumption we are dealing with is not
a presumption which either creates a crime or
establishes the fact that a crime has been committed.
On the contrary it arises only after proof by competent
evidence that an offense, including all essential
elements thereof, has been committed by some person and
that such offense has been committed by and through the
use of an instrumentality which defendants has caused
to be registered in the public records of the state in
his name and which by virtue of such registration he is
primarily, of all persons in the state, entitled to
use.
The closeness of this relationship, together with the need of the
presumption for effective traffic enforcement, lead the Chief
Justice of the Utah Supreme Court to support the
constitutionality of the presumption here in question. Chief
Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion in Nasfell v. Ogden City,
supra, stated:
I opine that an ordinance passed under State granted
power which provides that a judicial tribunal having
jurisdiction may find an owner or a person registered
as owner of an automobile guilty of the charge of
excess or illegal parking in a proscribed area when it
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appears from the evidence that the car of such
registered owner has been found to have been overparked
or park€id in a proscribed area and such owner, after
reasonable notice of the fact of such excess or
proscribed parking, fails to bring forth satisfactory
proof that he is not the owner, or if the owner, that
such car was not overparked or was not parked in a
proscribed area by him or at his direction is
constitutional.
While such procedure places upon an owner the
obligation to free himself from a law imposed
presumption of guilty arising from the fact that he
appears in the records as the registered owner, I
think, in the interests of traffic regulation, such
presumption may be indulged without running afoul of
constitutional objections respecting failure to accord
due process.
Thus, it appears universally, that the inference here in
question satisfies the most stringent standards courts have
applied in judging permissible criminal law inferences.

These

requirements are satisfied because the defendant is not precluded
from rebutting any element of the substantive offense.
If the standards are met in judging criminal law inferences,
they certainly are met in judging civil law inferences such as
are present in the instant case.

POINT VIII

SALT LAKE CITY'S CIVIL PARKING ORDINANCE,
SECTION 12.56.530, PATTERNED AFTER A CHICAGO
ORDINANCE, VALIDLY IMPOSES STRICT AND VICARIOUS
LIABILITY UPON THE OWNER OF AN ILLEGALLY
PARKED VEHICLE, REGARDLESS OF WHO PARKED IT.
Salt Lake City's current civil parking ordinance, Section
12.56.530, was enacted in 1986, several years after Hutchinson
was decided.

It was patterned after, and is identical to, a
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Chicago ordinance which was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court.
City of Chicago v. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., (1978), 71
111. 2d 333, 17 111. Dec. 1, 375 N.E. 2d 1285, cert,
U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 315, 58 L.Ed. 2d 322.

denied,
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In Hertz, the Court

ruled that the ordinance imposes vicarious liability on a
registered owner of a vehicle parking in violation with the
result that proof that the vehicle was in possession of another
at the time of violation is irrelevant to the substantive
offense.

The Court stated:
The defendants vigorously argue that the plain meaning
of the words "prima facie responsible" in the Chicago
ordinance indicates that it was the municipality's
clear intention to allow the registered owner to rebut
the presumption that the vehicle was parked by the
owner. The issue cannot be so facilely resolved. The
words "prima facie" mean nothing more than "at first
sight" or "so far as can be judged from the first
disclosure" or "without more" . . . In its statutory
context the words "prima facie" mean that the City has
established its case against the registered owner by
proving (1) the existence of an illegally parked
vehicle, and (2) registration of that vehicle in the
name of the defendant. Such proof constitutes a prima
facie case against the defendant owner. There is no
indication in the ordinance that the owner, to be
presumed responsible for the violation, must be
presumed to have been the person who parked the
vehicle. In practice, the defendant, to absolve
himself of responsibility, may show that the vehicle
was not parked illegally or that he was not the
registered owner of the vehicle at the time of the
alleged violation. The defenses are limited, but the
plain meaning of the ordinance admits of no more.
. . . This unambiguous language imposes both strict and
vicarious liability on the owner whenever his vehicle
is illegally parked, irrespective of whether the owner
was the person who parked the vehicle.

Hertz, supra, at page 1288 (emphasis added) (citations deleted).
The Court, in Hertz, made note of cases from three other
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jurisdictions which had interpreted the words "prima facie
responsible" in accord with the Hertz Court's interpretation.
See City of Columbus.Ohio v. Webster, 170 Ohio St. 327, 328, 164
N.E. 2d 734, 735 (Ohio 1960); Kansas City v. Hertz Corp., 499
S.W. 2d 449, 452-453 (Mo. 1973);
N.W. 2d 102, 103 (Iowa 1976)-

and Iowa City v. Nolan, 239

See also 60 ALR 4th 784, 872.

The Hertz Court likewise upheld the ordinance against
challenges, inter

alia,

that (1) it imposed an irrebuttable

presumption in contravention of constitutional due process
protections (the defendant is not precluded form rebutting either
element of the substantive offense), and (2) that it denied
defendants equal protection under the law.
Therefore, under the Hertz rationale, Salt Lake City's
ordinance 12.56.530 validly and constitutionally imposes strict
and vicarious liability upon the owner of an illegally parked
vehicle, regardless of who may have parked it.

POINT IX.
SALT LAKE
ORDINANCE
PROCESS.
APPELLANT

CITY'S STRICT LIABILITY PARKING
DOES NOT DENY APPELLANT DUE
SECTION 12.56.560 DOES NOT DENY
DUE PROCESS.

Appellant argues that Salt Lake City's Section 12.56.560,
which holds a person in whose name a vehicle is registered which
had been employed in the unauthorized use of Salt Lake City
streets as strictly liable for such unauthorized use, is
violative of his due process rights.
Strict liability statutes and ordinances have long been
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recognized in the law, particularly in regulatory measures, where
the mala prohibitum

emphasis of the law is upon the achievement

of some social betterment rather than punishment of crimes, as in
cases of mala in se.

See Morissette v. United States of America,

342 US 246, 96 L ed 288, 72 S Ct 240 (1952).
One legal scholar has cited and classified a large number of
cases applying the doctrine of "crimes without intent," and
concludes that they fall roughly into subdivisions of:
(1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of
impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of
misbranded articles, (4) violations of antinarcotic
Acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic
regulations, (7) violations of motor-vehicle laws, and
(8) violations of general police regulation, passed for
the safety, health or well-being of the community.
(Emphasis added.)

Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col L Rev

55, 73, 84; referred to in Morissette, supra, footnote 20, at 96
L ed 288, 300.
As was noted in Point IV above, the Utah Supreme Court has
upheld the authority of a municipality to enact an ordinance
imposing strict criminal liability upon a tavern owner for
permitting an underage person to come upon the tavern premises,
even in the absence of proof of criminal intent.

Ronnenburq,

supra.
With regard to the claim of a violation of due process,
Appellee has addressed this issue under Point VIII above. The
same rationale which was applied in the Hertz case is applicable
here.

That is, that since the defendant is not precluded from

rebutting either element of the substantive offense (that he is
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the owner of the vehicle or that the vehicle was not illegally
parker), the constitutional requirement of procedural due process
is satisfied.

Hertz, supra, at page 1291.

POINT X.
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE APPLICATION OF THE
COMMON LAW PARKING INFERENCE AND
THE ORDINANCES CHALLENGED BY APPELLANT.

Parking enforcement is one of the lease glamorous but most
critical of municipal functions.

Its objectives are founded in

public safety and welfare and in common courtesy.

There are

within every community persons who despise such laws and hold
them as a butt of their humor.

They repeatedly flout the

interests of their fellow citizens by parking within crowded
downtown traffic lanes, on high-speed expressways, across private
driveways, near school crosswalks, or in emergency zones or
handicapped parking areas.

One need only read an occasional

police accident report to realize the hazard and inconvenience
posed to citizens by these drivers.
Law enforcement is often the only means by which thoughtless
and often anonymous parking violators are reminded of their
obligations to others.

Salt Lake City, of course, does not

suggest that the violations by Defendant/Appellant in this
particular action are as critical to public safety and welfare as
certain other parking laws.

But Defendant/Appellant's challenge

to the historic parking presumption, and to the subject parking
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ordinances, jeopardizes our entire parking enforcement program.
As stated by the Court in People v. Biqman, 100 P.2d 370, 373:
The great convenience to the state through operation of
this presumption in the proof of identity of operators
in cases of illegal parking on the thousands of miles
of highways in the state or to the officers of a
municipality in enforcing the laws within the more
limited but still relatively extensive public streets
therein, is readily apparent. It is a matter of common
knowledge, of which we may take notice, that is would
be, and has in fact been, impractical for a city the
size of that wherein this prosecution arose (Los
Angeles; and we do not doubt that the same is
relatively true in municipalities throughout the state)
to maintain a police force large enough to personally
detect any substantial portion of vehicular parking law
violators by observing them in the act of illegal
parking or by discovering the illegally parked vehicle
and awaiting the return of the absent operators. The
extent of the convenience to the state, it seems
apparent to us, will far outweigh such inconvenience as
may be occasioned to some registered owners whose
automobiles when used by others may be illegally parked
and result in the owners having to appear and answer
the charges. In such instances, however, except in the
comparatively rare cases of stolen or unlawfully moved
cars, the owners can protect themselves by permitting
their automobiles to be used only by persons who will
be responsible to them for any unlawful parking of the
vehicles. In any event, the inconvenience is basically
caused not by the operation of the presumption of
identity of the operator but rather by the violation by
the actual operator of the substantive law involved.
In no way whatsoever does the operation of the
presumption preclude the owner from his right to
challenge the fact as to who did operate the vehicle.
To strike down the parking presumption as unconstitutional
may do more than destroy the foundation of the parking
enforcement program of every major city within the court's
jurisdiction.

Should courts begin to require new and burdensome

tests for factual presumptions, vast areas of law enforcement
generally may be critically affected.

(The theft and drug cases

considered by the U.S. Supreme Court and cited herein are typical
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of the kinds of prosecutions which may be impinged.)

POINT XI

THE COURT OF APPEAL HAS NO JURISDICTION
TO REVIEW THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
OF THE TRIAL DE NOVO JUDGMENT. HOWEVER,
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENT AT
TRIAL TO SUSTAIN THE CIRCUIT COURT JUDGMENT
Appellee will not spend much space addressing
Defendant/Appellant's argument that there was insufficient
evidence presented at the trial de novo to sustain the judgment
of the Circuit Court,

Appellee has already emphasized its

contention that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal
in this case.

Such argument obviously applies to a review of the

sufficiency of the evidence below, since there is no statutory
basis for such review and since it is clear from the statutes
cited in Point I hereinabove that the legislature intended that
the Circuit Court be the final Court of appeal from the Small
Claims Court on all issues other than where a statute or
ordinance is declared unconstitutional.
As was stated in State v. Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah App.
1990) in the instance of an appeal in a criminal case:
. • . once a justice court judgment is appealed to
circuit court, Article I, Section 12 and Article VIII,
Section 5 of the State Constitution do not entitle a
disgruntled party to plenary review on the record of
the circuit court's judgment in the do novo proceeding.
Matus, supra, at p. 305.

See also City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990).
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In any event, a review of the trial de novo transcript
reveals that the required elements of the plaintiff's complaint
were established by competent evidence; that is, that the vehicle
in question was parked in violation of the City's ordinances and
that Defendant/Appellant Leahy was the registered owner of that
vehicle at the time of violation. Trial transcript, pages 5, 6.
Defendant/Appellant Leahy failed to present any evidence
contradicting the City's evidence and did not present evidence
that he was not the person who had parked the vehicle.
Therefore, viewing Section 12.56.530 as imposing either a common
law or a statutory presumption that Leahy was the person who
parked the vehicle, or viewing that ordinance as imposing strict
and vicarious liability upon Leahy, there was sufficient evidence
presented for the Court to find Leahy liable to the City.
Likewise, the same evidence was sufficient under the overt strict
liability ordinance, Section 12.56.560, to sustain the trial
Court's j udgment.

CONCLUSION

This Court has no jurisdiction over the appeal in this
instance, since (1) Appellant has not given notice of these
proceedings to the Attorney General, (2) Appellant raises his
challenge of the State statute for the first time on this appeal,
and because (3) no State statute or local ordinance has been
found to be unconstitutional as required by Section 78-6-10, Utah
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Code Annotated 1953 as amended.

Appellant's challenge to the

constitutionality of the said State statute and to Salt Lake City
Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 must fail since Appellant has
failed to meet his burden to show, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that said statute and ordinances are violative of any
constitutional right to which Appellant is entitled.

The

challenged statute and ordinances are entitled to a presumption
of constitutionality.

They meet the constitutional requirements

of due process, open access to the Courts, and equal protection
of the laws.

This Court should uphold the said statute and

ordinances as being constitutional, and should find Appellant's
appeal to be without basis.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5~

day of A/OV£M&£j^

1992.
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